INTRODUCTION
The sale of goods contract archetype has played a cardinal socioeconomic role since the adoption of currency.
1 Throughout history, this prominence has prompted numerous legal systems to develop bespoke rules for such transactions, supplemental to general contract law.
2 Their 1. For an analysis of the impact of currency on both private bargains and the broader economy in ancient civilizations, including Mesopotamia under the Code of Hammurabi (2123 -2081 , and ancient Egypt see PAUL EINZIG, PRIMITIVE MONEY (1949) . For a rich analysis also considering religious ancient sources see Benjamin Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History-On Commerce, Tyranny, and the Modern Law of Money, 25 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 115 (1987 enabled new business models that depend on IP license agreements rather than sale of goods contracts. 6 As the world advances towards an ever more digital future, such trends will only amplify and proliferate. This forecast is further supported by recent attempts to commoditize non-exclusive license contracts and publicly trade them on regulated exchanges. 7 At the domestic level, the regime governing IP licenses typically stems from the intersections 8 between multiple legal streams, including contract law, IP law, labor law, competition law, and consumer law.
9 Notably, the 2018]
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applicable rules and principles are difficult to appraise holistically, as they are scattered throughout diverse areas of the law. Identifying precisely all the tesserae of this mosaic, deciphering the order in which they come together, and comprehending the picture that they create can be extremely challenging. As a result, the prevailing view is that the resulting normative framework is fettered by substantive lacunae and suffers from doctrinal underdevelopment.
10
A comparative analysis of the national regimes for IP licenses reveals marked divergences. Across jurisdictions, there is a jarring lack of alignment of both the relevant branches of the law and the manners in which they intersect.
11 Moreover, while multiple international projects have harmonized the foundational tenets of national legislations regulating the most prominent IP rights archetypes, 12 similar initiatives 1256 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 devoted to the law governing contractual dealings involving IP rights and license agreements have borne meagre fruit.
13
Legal practitioners, academics, non-governmental entities, and international organizations alike have long mooted ameliorations to the legal framework governing IP licenses, both nationally and internationally.
14 In some jurisdictions, this has led to governmentcommissioned reviews, which have scrutinized the extant body of rules and recommended legislative interventions. 15 Among international organizations, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Laws ("UNCITRAL") 16 has cautiously yet persistently expressed interest in a future work addressing the legal framework of IP license contracts. Sep. 7, 2017) . The British Government broadly accepted these recommendations, yet has been slow in implementing them (see http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf). 'L L. 7 (1989) .
17. At the time of its foundation, UNCITRAL identified nine subject matters for its future endeavors, including Intellectual Property; see U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., at ¶ ¶ 40 and 48, supp. 16 A/7216 (1968) . Future work on the legal framework of IP licenses at both national and international level has been under consideration at UNCITRAL for some time: see U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L., UNCITRAL Report of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on Its Fourteenth Session Comm'n Doc. A/CN.9/667, at ¶ 141; U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.,141; Report of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on Its Fifteenth Session Comm'n Doc. A/CN.9/670, at ¶ ¶ 123-26: "With respect to a contractual guide on intellectual property licensing, it was observed that it would be an extremely important project, which 2018]
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE CONTRACTS 1257
Despite this, none of the UNCITRAL Member States ("Member States") have yet explicitly championed such an initiative nor shown willingness to submit an official proposal for the consideration of the UNCITRAL Commission.
18
At the UNCITRAL Fourth Colloquium on Secured Transactions, 19 panelists discussed the topic of "IP licensing" 20 examining the problems afflicting the law regulating these agreements in many jurisdictions and focusing on the oft-fraught dialogue between contract and IP law. This was followed by a debate on a hypothetical UNCITRAL project on the law of voluntary IP licenses ("Project"), which would be aimed at fostering improvements to national legal regimes and stimulating international harmonization. This paper aspires to advance the aforementioned discourse.
It would be entirely premature to formulate a complete and detailed proposal for the Project at this stage. This paper instead ventures to examine methodically three salient points that are logical prerequisites to crafting a conscientiously-formed proposal. First, attention will be devoted to the potential scope of the Project. Secondly, a comparative analysis of the substantive rules governing IP license contracts will be conducted, for the dual purpose of providing representative examples of the types of legal conundrums that Member States would have to tackle at the heart of the Project and expounding the decision-making processes required to conceive "consensus" 21 solutions. Thirdly, an assessment will be performed of the possible, alternative forms that the Project could assume and their associated ramifications. Lastly, concluding observations will recommend a strategy for the advancement of the Project to its next phase.
would address key issues of law relating to intellectual property."; Planned and possible future work Comm'n Doc. A/CN.9/774, at ¶ 11; Planned and possible future work Comm'n Doc. A/CN.9/807, at ¶ 13; Planned and possible future work Comm'n Doc. A/CN.9/841, at ¶ 14.
18 As a logical antecedent to any foray into matters of substance, Member States would be required to define the scope of the Project. As IP license contracts are a vast and diverse archetype, this determination would be demanding. It is submitted that a scrupulous decision-making process would involve an assessment of two distinct legal dimensions.
First, IP licenses impact a sweeping range of socio-economic interests, giving rise to legal issues that differ in nature and are governed by rules stemming from diverse areas of the law. Structurally, IP licenses are binding promises between persons; they generate private law questions that are answered by contract law. Functionally, they are dealings for the purpose of exploiting IP rights; they engender issues that are proprietary in nature and fall within the realm of IP law. Concurrently, IP licenses can also attract the attention of competition law, labor law, consumer protection law and international private law, depending on the content of the undertakings stipulated by the parties.
In approaching this dimension, it would be for Member States to decide whether the Project should engage with all these branches of the law or rather concentrate on a narrower selection. At first glance, it might appear unproblematic to exclude delimited areas a priori, such as consumer protection or unfair competition. A more rigorous analysis, however, reveals that compartmentalizing IP license contracts is conceptually Gordian, as issues pertaining to discrete branches of the law can be closely intertwined and difficult to resolve in isolation. This would be especially true with regard to contract law and IP law, as license agreements are often characterized by a coalescence of obligatory and proprietary profiles, owing to the nature and function of these transactions.
Secondly, IP licenses cannot be described as a homogeneous category. These contracts all share a functional core: the licensor grants to the licensee a form of permission to perform actions that would otherwise be an infringement of the licensed IP.
22 Nevertheless, the rights and obligations of the parties vary markedly depending on multifarious elements. The nature and quantity of the licensed IP rights, the breadth and limitations of the grant, the compensation structure, and the legal status of the parties, can all profoundly affect the respective legal spheres of the licensor and licensee.
In approaching this second dimension, it would be for Member States to deliberate whether the Project should encompass all license agreements 22. This common functional core is recognized ubiquitously; Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 (for a European law perspective) 3.2.2; NIMMER & DODD, supra note 8, at § §1:2 (for United States perspective); Xue, supra note 9 (for a Chinese law perspective); Krishnamurthy, supra note 9 (for an Indian law perspective); in Japanese law Teramoto, supra note 9.
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without exception, or rather delve into a sub-group of this category. In the former case, the Project would seek to articulate a ruleset that concentrates on the functional core of IP licenses, yet eschew delving into the singularities of the many existing incarnations of these contracts. Its emphasis would be on pinpointing problems and elaborating solutions that apply to all types of IP licenses uniformly. Coextensively, caution would be required to ensure that unintended consequences were not inflicted on the regime of any one type of license agreement. Alternatively, if Member States decided that the scope of the Project should be confined to licenses with particular attributes, the objective would be to conduct an exhaustive study into the designated subject matter. For example, Member States might elect to focus exclusively on licenses that involve a certain type of IP -such as copyrights, patents or trademarks -are international in nature, are entered into by legal persons, or have a specific commercial structure. The notable advantage of limiting the categories of licenses encompassed by the Project is that it would mitigate the risk of unintended consequences arising from the broadbrush strokes required when addressing all these transactions as a unitary subject matter. Nevertheless, it would be challenging to identify a subgroup of licenses characterized by socio-legal singularities sufficient to merit its own set of rules and the associated systemic fragmentation cost.
Thus, the determination of the scope of the Project would present Member States with a vast spectrum of options. At one extreme, a wide remit embracing all license types and the totality of legal issues that they elicit, regardless of the area of the law to which they pertain. At the other, a narrow scope, comprising only licenses with very peculiar attributes and only tackling profiles that relate to one branch of the law. This would be a cardinal policy choice with far-reaching ramifications, as will be shown in subsequent paragraphs devoted to substantive rules.
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROJECT
It would be beyond the editorial limits of this contribution to explore exhaustively all facets of the body of rules governing IP license agreements that the Project may investigate.
Attention will be directed, however, to seven problematic areas that possess doctrinal complexity, carry commercial relevance and are indicative of the conceptual challenges faced by Member States. For each area, this paper will conduct a tripartite analysis: first, describing briefly the current state of the law across jurisdictions; secondly, scrutinizing the substance of these rules and appraising the degree of international dissonance; thirdly, theorizing the methodological approaches that Member States might adopt to confront these issues and, to a lesser extent,
1260
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 the type of substantive solutions they might consider.
A. Licensing of jointly-owned IP rights
It is uniformly accepted that rights-holders can license their IP.
23
However, the legal regime for the licensing of jointly-owned 24 rights varies markedly across jurisdictions.
25 From a systemic perspective, most states provide special IP rules to regulate the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights; however, in some, this matter is subject to general property law. 26 In similar vein, these rules are typically derogable in nature, yet there are exceptions. 27 With regard to substance, most jurisdictions lack a unitary approach, adopting heterogeneous regimes for jointly-owned copyright, patents, trademarks and design rights. 28 In some, licenses can be granted by one co-owner, absent the consent or knowledge of the other joint-owners. 29 In others, the consent of all co-owners is a validity The Project should consider advocating a uniform approach for the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights. It would be for Member States to consider two distinct, yet logically contiguous issues. First, they would have to decide whether a right-holder can ever grant a license without the consent of their joint-owners. The cardinal query is whether it is acceptable for a joint owner to suffer a detrition of their exclusive right without their consent, even at the hands of one of their fellow co-owners. Systemically, the competing legal interests are the erga omnes nature of IP and the right to exploit and dispose of these rights. 34 If an affirmative answer were provided to this cardinal query, Member States would be faced with the task of defining precisely the circumstances in which a right-holder is at liberty to grant licenses of jointly-owned IP rights. As national laws lack alignment on this matter, compromise would not be easy.
Secondly, it would be for Member States to regulate the position of a person who enters into a license agreement with a right-holder who failed to obtain the required consent of their joint-owners. Here, the tension is between co-owners unwilling to suffer a deterioration of their exclusive right and licensees who have legitimate expectations of exploiting the permission they have contractually obtained. In this context, the rival legal interests are, on one hand, upholding the "certainty" of the absolute nature of IP rights and, on the other, ensuring the "certainty" of commercial dealings. 35 Mutatis mutandis this is a conundrum analogous to that faced when elaborating principles to adjudicate conflicts stemming from transfers of title by non-owners (traditio a non domino); 36 with the crucial distinction that a licensee in this position cannot acquire material and exclusive control of the subject matter of a license due to its intangible nature but merely venture to perform activities falling within the scope of the improperly licensed IP.
37
In principle, there is an ample spectrum of possible solutions. At one end of this spectrum, unreserved protection of the property rights of the non-consenting joint-owner, directing the licensee to take action against their injudicious licensor; at the other, unexempted upholding of the granted license, eroding the breadth of the proprietary right of the nonconsenting joint-owners and granting them recourse against the licensors. joint-owner failed to act promptly, the licensee was misled, the license was not granted for value, or the licensee had knowledge of the existence of the joint-owners.
38
Faced with such a broad variety of alternative solutions, it is submitted that a two-stage decision-making process would be appropriate to steer Member States towards a consensus. At the outset, a fundamental decision would be required, deliberating whether the interest of the licensee or that of the non-consenting co-owner should be favored as a general rule. This would be followed by the careful integration of exceptions aimed at mitigating the inflexibility that would otherwise flow from an unrestricted application of the adopted general norm. In making these choices, Member States would greatly benefit from both ex ante agreement on the normative objectives to be pursued and a comparative assessment of the positive law in force across different jurisdictions.
Interestingly, the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights furnishes a felicitous example of the type of issue that would lie at the heart of a broadly-scoped Project. Member States, fueled by frustration with present levels of national fragmentation and international disharmony, 39 might find a unitary approach to this matter singularly palatable.
B. Pre-contractual negotiations
Private law has traditionally taken a keen interest in pre-contractual negotiations, yet the approaches adopted vary markedly, both methodologically and substantively, across jurisdictions. 40 Historically, 38. These are some of the factors most typically considered by national legislations when dealing with the conflict between a dispossessed owner and a good faith purchaser; see generally Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, supra note 36 (offering normative solutions to this conundrum based on a law and economics analysis aimed at maximizing utility); Sacco, supra note 36 (for a comparative approach in the context of international sales); Salomons, supra note 36 (for a utilitarian normative approach to the conundrum of bona fide purchasers vis-a-vis unlawfully dispossessed owners).
39. IP legislation has not introduced special rules for the negotiations of license contracts; even in legal orders with a propensity to scrutinize these interactions closely, IP law has not strayed from the general contract law regime.
In the past, IP license negotiations predominantly took place either between businesses, or individual IP rights holders and businesses. These transactions were largely domestic, featured grants over a small number of IP rights, and involved a linear compensation structure; typically, such agreements were preceded by discussions of limited profundity that involved insubstantial exchanges of information.
41
Over the past fifty years, the landscape of IP license negotiations has evolved. In the high-volume, low-value market segment, the mass distribution of digital products and services has irreversibly brought consumers into the factual matrix of IP license negotiations;
42 the feverish propagation of the internet of things will further promulgate this trend, as 183, 190-192 (1994) 
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sales contracts for tangible goods will be increasingly coupled with grants of licenses over the associated IP. 43 In the low-volume, high-value market segment, international licensing and cross-licensing deals of entire IP portfolios have acquired substantial strategic significance. Parties' interactions preceding these transactions involve exchanges of large quantities of information, and can give rise to confidentiality issues. 44 In recent past, European jurisdictions have begun to recalibrate their consumer protection legislation to address this new environment, also reviewing pre-contractual interactions preceding IP licenses. 45 Concurrently, academics have begun to query more insistently whether extant private law rules possess sufficient elasticity to accommodate these developments. 46 Thus, the Project may consider whether the legal framework of IP licenses might benefit from special rules governing pre-contractual negotiations. It is submitted that this determination would be buttressed by a decision-making process divided into two logically-distinct stages. In the first, it would be for Member States to ascertain the existence of (2008) If this enquiry were answered in the affirmative, the subsequent step would be to identify normative interventions capable of remedying these mischiefs and ultimately, a selection of the preferable options.
The European Union has been leading the way on this particular front; see HANS SCHULTE-NÖLKE, CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER & MARTIN EBERS, EC CONSUMER LAW COMPENDIUM: THE CONSUMER ACQUIS AND ITS TRANSPOSITION IN THE MEMBER STATES

48
Notably, the scope of the Project would markedly affect the palatability of a set of special rules governing negotiations of IP licenses. If its remit were broad, both in terms of relevant areas of the law and license types, the magnitude and diversity of the subject matter under consideration would render the recognition of common issues challenging. A wide range of transactions would need to be parsed, alongside extensive empirical evidence from an array of subjects and economic sectors. In similar vein, the divergences that exist between the legal approaches adopted across jurisdictions to regulate negotiations would render agreement on the substantive rules to be adopted by the Project arduous to achieve.
If the scope of Project were narrow, by contrast, the aforementioned difficulties would be materially reduced. Analyzing a subset of transaction archetypes would simplify the task of identifying legal wrongs and the agreement of substantive rules to resolve them. However, it should be noted that introducing special rules that only regulate negotiations of a small group of IP licenses would carry a hefty price for systemic fragmentation. 
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C. Formation
Contract formation is shaped by private law tenets. Though there are differences between common and civil law systems, a degree of conceptual uniformity does pervade across jurisdictions. 49 IP law establishes but few exceptions to this body of rules, otherwise conforming to it unreservedly. 50 In this brief contribution, it is not possible to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into all facets of the formation of IP license contracts that Member States could explore. The following analysis will concentrate on two topics: consent in standard form IP license agreements and form requirements. The former involves exploring a thorny intersection between IP law and contract law, and affords the opportunity to revisit a well-trodden issue with fresh eyes. By contrast, form requirements present legislative policy challenges in the broader context of international harmonization. 54 Historically, IP law has not sought to depart from these general rules.
Over the course of the 20 th century, standard form contracts have permeated almost every facet of commerce. 55 In the realm of IP, this trend has been especially apparent in the technology sector.
56 Among legal scholars, one long-held thesis contends that standard form contracts sit uneasily with the consent paradigm as formulated by classical contract law theory. 57 This submission has its roots in the empirical observation that offerees generally do not read the terms of standard form contracts and offerors do not expect them to do so.
58 From this premise, proponents of this view posit that offerees cannot be held to have consented to undertakings the content of which was unknown to them 59 Though lingering notes of discontent have continued to chime, 61 the largely prevailing stance among courts and commentators internationally is that standard form contracts are binding.
62 Two arguments are advanced in support of this conclusion. The first is that offerees who "manifest" their assent to be legally bound by the terms of a standard form contract are deemed to have consented from an objective perspective, even if they failed to read them in fact. 63 The second is that offerees who accept a standard form contract are deemed to have given "a blanket assent . . . to any not unreasonable or indecent terms . . . which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms."
64
This debate has resurfaced with renewed fervor in respect of IP licenses, owing to the widespread use of "shrinkwrap" "clickwrap" and "browsewrap" standard forms for these agreements ("Wrap Licenses").
65
Legal scholars have emphasized that the idiosyncratic formation process 60. For a detailed explanation of this argument see Barnett, supra note 59 at 628-29; Perillo, supra note 52.
61. An example is found in Rakoff, supra note 55 (highlighting that conceptual infrastructure of general contract law struggles to accommodate comfortably the realities of standard form contracts of Wrap Licenses greatly magnifies the consent dilemma afflicting traditional standard form contracts. 66 They observe that the terms of these agreements raise grave systemic concerns, as they confer far-reaching rights to the offeror that are often entirely unanticipated by the offeree.
67
Moreover, these same scholars question whether traditional theories and doctrines designed for paper-based standard form contracts can be adapted to accommodate Wrap licenses adequately.
68
Though they ultimately concede that the presence of consent in these agreements cannot be called into question, proponents of this view strongly advocate in favor of the introduction of special rules regulating either the negotiations preceding these contracts or their substance, especially if consumers are involved.
69
The law governing Wrap Licenses is in a state of flux across jurisdictions. In some, courts do not admit challenges to their enforceability based on a lack of consent, only timidly contemplating the possibility of invalidating individual terms, based on doctrines governing substantive fairness. 70 In others, Wrap Licenses can be successfully challenged for lack of consent and the substance of the stipulations therein can be questioned penetratingly. 71 The resulting international legal 
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framework is piecemeal and riddled with uncertainty. This is particularly problematic at a time when standard form terms are offered to a global audience of potential licensees over the internet, at an ever-accelerating pace and in a growing number of sectors. The Project might consider addressing this contentious matter. It is submitted that it would be for Member States to initially agree whether standard form IP licenses are capable of being vitiated by a lack of consent. If such a concern were unanimously shared by Member States, the circumstances in which acceptance of a standard form IP license gives rise to concerns regarding the consent of the licensee would have to be defined precisely; for example, it could be agreed that this is only the case if the license is entered into remotely or if a consumer were involved. The final step would be for Member States to elaborate substantive rules to resolve the aforementioned deficit of consent.
Notably, the scope of the Project would once more be of decisive importance in shaping this discussion. Though imperfect assent beleaguers Wrap licenses generally, the intensity of this issue varies markedly depending on the subjects involved in the transaction and the type of IP licensed.
Form requirements
Private law establishes tenets that govern form requirements for all contracts.
72 IP law commonly provides supplementary rules for 
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The Project should consider recommending a uniform legal regime for the form requirements, to promote international harmonization. Member States would undertake to seek equilibrium between two polarized impulses. At one extreme, the impetus to expedite contract formation and reduce transaction costs by minimizing form requirements. At the other, the desire to augment standardization and foster transparency by imposing formalities that require extensive disclosure of information.
It is submitted that this balancing assessment and the ensuing policy decision would be best informed by a comparative appraisal of the current state of the law across multiple jurisdictions and empirical data collected from stakeholders. Notably, the scale and complexity of this inquiry would differ substantially depending on the scope of the Project.
D. Content: rights and obligations of the licensor and licensee
It is a widely-accepted principle that persons can freely decide whether to enter into a contract, with whom and under which terms. 80 Nevertheless, the content of the synallagmatic nexus agreed by the parties does not exist in a vacuum but is rather affected by two distinct categories of legal rules. 81 The first are mandatory 82 rules ("MRs"). MRs curtail party autonomy by imposing non-derogable rights and obligations on contracting parties; 83 they are typically either prescriptive or proscriptive in nature.
84
The second category consists of default 85 rules ("DRs"). DRs establish rights and obligations that apply to the contracting parties only in so far as they have not agreed otherwise; the defining feature of these rules is that they are presumptive. 86 IP licenses are subject to MRs and DRs that apply to all binding pacts generally, as well as those specifically crafted for these agreements. The latter group of rules stems primarily from IP laws, yet can also emerge from other branches of the law, such as competition law and consumer law. A comparative analysis of the rules impacting the content of IP licenses reveals significant differences in their prevalence, substance and intensity across jurisdictions. Notably, disharmony is most pronounced in relation to copyright licenses.
88
With regard to MRs, some jurisdictions establish a thicket of rules that severely limit the freedom of the parties to architect their own agreement. Others contemplate but few MRs of proscriptive nature, allowing ample space for the parties' contractual creativity. These conflicting approaches are an external manifestation of both the proclivity of the legal order in question to encroach on private transactions and, more generally, the value attributed to freedom of contract. By contrast, across jurisdictions there is a relative paucity of DRs specifically addressing IP licenses; when they are present, they tend to concentrate on matters of secondary importance. Notable in its absence is a discernible systemic approach.
89
It is almost a foregone conclusion that Member States would devote significant attention to the consideration of possible MRs and DRs that would affect the content of IP license agreements. Negotiations would likely be challenging, owing to the substantially different approaches that TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 346-347 (1978) 
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exist at national level. Though MRs and DRs combine to create a unitary body of rules, it is submitted that Member States would benefit from adopting distinct decision-making processes for their formulation, owing to their profound ontological and functional differences.
1. Decision-making process for mandatory rules
In principle, there are two bases of adoption for a MR: protection of an interest of either one or both the contracting parties; and protection of an interest of persons not privy to this contract-society at large or a segment thereof. Crucially, the threshold of adoption is high: the interest under consideration must be deemed of such systemic importance as to warrant the introduction of a non-derogable rule that either restricts or completely precludes the parties' autonomy to stipulate otherwise in their agreement.
A comparative analysis reveals that MRs applicable to all contracts typically protect general interests such as legality, the integrity of consent, and reliance.
90 By contrast, MRs that apply to determinate contracts safeguard interests that are vital to their designated context of application. In the realm of copyright, non-derogable rules that nullify any attempt of an author to assign or license their moral rights are a revelatory example of an MR aimed at protecting an interest deemed to be of critical importance to this branch of IP law. 91 Thus, in formulating MRs, it would be for Member States to define first which normative objectives the Project should seek to pursue when regulating IP license contracts, and their respective order of priority. Thereafter, Member States should dissect the structure of IP license agreements to ascertain which segments lend themselves to stipulations capable of undermining the objectives that have been identified as worthy of protection, if left entirely to unrestricted party autonomy. This decision-making process would involve legal, political, social, and economic considerations. It should, however, be shaped by the observation that the function of MRs is to protect interests deemed systemically significant. The bases for the adoption of DRs are highly contentious spawning vivacious discussions and vast literature. Legal scholars, philosophers and economists are deeply divided with regard to the policy aims that should inform these rules.
96
The most widely-supported theory is that DRs should promote economic efficiency. Among its proponents, however, there is disagreement concerning the manner in which these rules should achieve this objective. 97 suggestions that DRs should be grounded in the customs, usages and practices of the parties' community ("Conventionalism"), 98 formalities, 99 the consent of the contracting parties 100 or morality. 101 Recently, two further foundations for DRs have been proposed: the history of the legal order in question and its constitution.
102
In light of such profoundly diverging stances, Member States would face a schismatic decision in electing the bases of adoption for the DRs to be included in the Project. One possibility might be to embrace one of the aforementioned theories. In principle, such a choice would be elegant and offer consistency; in practice, it would be both politically and substantively problematic to realize, as reaching a consensus on the principle to be followed would be wearying. Alternatively, Member States could opt for an "eclectic" method that takes into account multiple bases concurrently. 103 This strategy would make allowances for a range of views and sensitivities, though it would saddle Member States with the heavy burden of formulating an order of priority among the chosen principles.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the intergovernmental and international nature of the Project would intrinsically simplify this decision-making process. In the ambit of negotiations involving a large number of sovereign actors with profoundly different histories, social norms, and traditions, striving to ground DRs in historical, constitutional or moral considerations would be unrealistic. Accordingly, the most viable bases of adoption to be considered by Member States would likely be a combination of economic efficiency and Conventionalism. 100. For an explanation of this thesis and a cogent critique, see Christopher A. Riley, Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent, Conventionalism, and Efficiency, 20 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 367, 370-75 (2000) .
101. See Burton, supra note 98 (default rules should be based on the coordinating principle of fairness). For a comprehensive bibliography see Craswell, supra note 86 at 12-13.
102. See Hesselink, supra note 87 at 62-65. 103. See Riley, supra note 100 at 389-90; Hesselink, supra note 87at 69.
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Even where jurisdictions share common principles and rules of construction, their method of application can differ meaningfully.
111
Moreover, while interpretation is a matter of law in some legal orders, it is one of fact in others.
112
IP law canons of construction for license agreements are supplementary in nature, as they complement the general rules and principles laid out by contract law.
113 Notably, their scope of application varies. Some apply horizontally to all licenses regardless of the type of IP involved. For example, there are jurisdictions where a principle has emerged which suggests that both ambiguous and unclear terms in such contracts should be interpreted in favor of the licensor.
114
By contrast, in most jurisdictions, the vast majority of established IP canons of construction have a narrower scope, confined to agreements that involve a particular form of IP. This is especially apparent in the realm of copyright. For example, in France, 111. See Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 129-36; BURTON, supra note 97 at 1. 112. For a thorough explanation of this topic and a comparative analysis across jurisdictions see Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 129-30; D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at II-8:101 (providing a comparative overview of European jurisdictions).
113. In the United States, alongside contract law principles of individual states, the Uniform Commercial Code Art. 2 has also influenced the interpretation of IP licenses; see GOMULKIEWICZ, supra note 9 at 5-6; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 § 4:2.
114. Notably, in the United States, contract law of individual states typically holds that ambiguous terms must be construed contra proferentem; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981) . However, this canon is often disregarded in IP licenses following the principle that such stipulations should be construed in favor of the licensor, see GOMULKIEWICZ, supra note 9 at 12-13 analyzing this principle of construction and the relevant case law.
115. Article L122-7(-4 French Intellectual Property Code; notably, the Cour de Cassation Cass. 1re.civ., 30 Sept. 2010 , CCE, 2010 Thus, the international legal landscape regarding the interpretation of IP license agreements displays a distinct lack of uniformity, which can be a source of costly uncertainty. To some extent, market participants can overcome this obstacle by way of dexterous drafting and by taking advantage of choice of law rules, yet such workarounds are inherently suboptimal.
The Project may consider exploring this nuanced facet of the legal framework governing IP licenses. It would be for Member States to develop bespoke hermeneutical rules and principles that would be conducive to reconstructing the intention of parties to IP licenses. Regrettably, in light of the profoundly diverging national approaches to contract construction generally and IP licenses specifically, it is submitted that agreeing both the approach and substance of such canons would be challenging. Additionally, Member States would face one particularly significant conceptual obstacle: any rule or principle of interpretation developed would need to be compatible or at least not at odds with general contract law canons of interpretation from across a vast number of jurisdictions.
Notably, the scope of Project would decisively affect endeavors addressing canons of construction for IP licenses. If its remit were broad, Members States would face a uniquely demanding challenge, as they would have to elaborate high-level construction principles, focusing on the interpretation of the functional core of IP licenses. If the scope of the Project were narrow, Member States might encounter fewer difficulties in crafting canons of interpretation that target precisely-delimited issues of construction germane to the type of license under consideration.
F. Registration
Registration systems are a staple of most legal orders. Typically, they record information such as the existence of goods deemed to be of elevated socio-economic importance, 129 the identity of persons, both legal and may also serve as a priority point in the resolution of conflicts between competing ayants cause. 142 In others still, registration is required for a licensee to be able to bring actions against infringers.
143 Adopting yet another normative approach, a small number of jurisdictions establish that a sub-set of licenses with defined attributes must be registered to be effective between contracting parties. 144 Academics, practitioners, and international organizations concur that this legislative discord is a source of both uncertainty and elevated transaction costs. However, opinions are deeply divided regarding the legal function that should be attributed to the registration of IP contracts generally, and of license agreements in particular.
One view is that registration should be required in order for IP licenses to be effective against third parties. The rationale is that documenting these transactions and the associated interests enhances legal certainty systemically; moreover, it promotes the commercial exploitation of IP rights, by enhancing the amount of information available to the public and facilitating regulatory supervision. 142. An important distinction needs to be drawn between two different approaches. Some legal systems set the priority point at the time of registration; for example, this the case under articles 138-140 Italian Industrial Property Code. Other jurisdictions establish that the priority point for third party effectiveness is the moment when the license agreement was concluded, provided that the agreement in question has been subsequently registered; this is the case under section UK PA § 33 and section UK TMA § 25. In the United States, there is no mandatory registration for copyright licenses, both nonexclusive and exclusive; however, under 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2010) recording of an exclusive license serves as constructive notice to third parties; moreover, under 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (2010) it is held that between conflicting transferees (including exclusive licensees) a later recorded interest prevails over a prior unrecorded interest, provided that the latter has not been registered within one month after its execution. It is an established private international law tenet that a distinction must be drawn between proprietary and contractual matters when determining the law applicable to IP contracts. 153 Proprietary matters are those that concern the IP right itself, including its existence, validity, scope of protection, duration, whether it can be assigned and licensed, and the registration requirements for these dealings. The orthodox position is that the law applicable to these issues is that of the State protecting the IP right object of the contract ("lex loci protectionis"); parties are not at liberty to postulate otherwise.
154
Contractual matters are those that concern the mutual rights and obligations stipulated by the parties, and the constituent elements of their agreement, including formation, 155 interpretation, performance, breach, nullity and remedies.
156 It is generally accepted that the law applicable to these facets is that governing the contract ("lex contractus"). 155. Formal validity of the contract must be distinguished from form requirements specifically established by IP law. The former is a matter for contract law governed by lex contractus, the latter is an IP law issue to which lex loci protectionis applies.
156. The remedies referred to here are those available for breach of an IP license under contract law; they are ulterior and distinct from the remedies available for infringement, under IP or criminal law. Notably, contract law remedies fall under lex contractus, whereas remedies stemming from IP law and criminal law, are subject to lex loci protectionis. 165 This provision establishes that the applicable law to determine the rights and obligations of the parties "with regard to contractual issues" is governed by the law of the state which has "the most significant relationship" with that issue. 166 Such a relationship should be assessed taking "into account" the following non-exclusive list of "contacts": "(a) the place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of a contract; (c) the place of performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, as well as place of business of the parties."
167 As a final principle, this section provides that if a contract is negotiated and performed in one state "the local law of this state will usually be . Notably, this section also states that this assessment must be generally guided by the principles listed in § 6(2): "the needs of an interstate system; the relevant policies of the forum and other interested forums; the justified expectations of the parties; the basic foundational principles of the area of law at issue; the uniformity and predictability of the result; and the ease in determination and application".
167. Restatement (Second) principle that proprietary matters are governed by lex loci protectionis, while contractual issues are regulated by the lex contractus. Similarly, they would accept unquestioningly that the parties are free to designate a law of their choosing for their agreement. Attention may instead be gainfully directed to two contentious problems that beset the application of these principles. First, the Project could elaborate guidelines to streamline and rationalize the process of characterization required to distinguish between matters that are deemed proprietary and those which are deemed contractual in IP license contracts. Though this distinction appears pellucid in theory, its clarity can be fatally wounded in the maws of a complex transaction. 176 
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Each one of these academic endeavors contains a bespoke provision for the determination of the law applicable to IP contracts bereft of a choice-of-law clause. On the surface, they all accept the closest connection rule as the solution best suited to resolve the private international law conundrum under consideration.
181 Alas, for the operation of this principle they rely on presumptions and interpretative factors that are not aligned and thus can yield diverging outcomes. 182 Ultimately, it would be for Member States to decide whether to espouse one of the approaches developed by any of these academic endeavors or ambitiously attempt to craft an alternative ruleset that bridges the chasms dividing them. It is submitted that this would not be a challenging decision in terms of its process; all attention could be devoted to substantive discussion. Regrettably, it is hard to imagine that consensus would be easily won on a battlefield upon which positions have been entrenched for the past two decades.
Notably, the scope of the Project would decisively influence the approach to the present topic. An applicable law rule for IP licenses would not even be considered if private international law issues were out of scope. Furthermore, if the Project had a narrow scope, the palatability of this topic would be significantly reduced, as the notion of developing an applicable law rule restricted to a sub-group of all IP license agreements would imply additional fragmentation in an area where harmonization is desired above all.
III. THE FORM OF THE PROJECT
The preceding discussion on scope and substance offers a robust foundation from which to consider the form that the Project might assume and the associated implications.
Over the past fifty years, UNCITRAL has developed and adopted "texts" that can be divided into three distinct form-categories: legislative, contractual and explanatory. The first, UNCITRAL texts in legislative form, are addressed to legislatures and are designed to be adopted by states through the enactment of domestic legislation. The three most common incarnations of UNCITRAL texts in legislative form are: conventions, model laws and legislative guides. 183 The trait that Based on the findings of this paper, such a proposal should be built on two pillars. First, it should incisively delineate a scope that is both precisely defined from a legal perspective, and socio-economically palatable. As this would be UNCITRAL's first foray into the law of IP licensing, temptations to cast this net too broadly should be resisted staunchly. Crucially, with regard to the areas of the law to be covered, it might be advisable to focus solely on contract law, IP law, and international private law; areas such as competition law, consumer law and labor law might be best left aside, owing to the elevated number of additional variables that they would bring to the fore. Equally, it might be advisable to exclude licenses which carry features that are treated in multifarious, manifestly different ways at a national level, as to include them would create difficulties irreconcilable a priori.
Secondly, this proposal should state lucidly the form-category that this project should assume, and substantiate its choice robustly. Based on the level of disharmony that presently characterizes national legal framework governing IP licenses, a text in legislative form might be the preferable option. It seems unlikely that an explanatory or contractual UNCITRAL initiative would successfully circumvent the obstacles raised by the numerous mandatory rules presently characterizing the law of several jurisdiction.
This proposal should also devote attention to substance. At this stage, it would be adequate to confine discussion to simply identifying the relevant subject matter to be covered within the suggested scope. The aspiration would be to express a level of detail sufficient to describe the key matters that would be covered, yet without depriving Member States of the necessary maneuvering space during subsequent negotiations.
Finally, as ever in international legal projects of this nature, political will and conviction would be integral to the favorable reception of this proposal by UNCITRAL. Any project seeking to address the law of IP licensing would inevitably encounter thorny negotiations, as it would be impossible to circumvent historically contentious legal postulates. This may at first glance render this project unappealing, particularly for those Member States that may be bruised by past, failed attempts to reform domestic IP licensing laws. Nevertheless, complexity alone should not deter Member States from striking boldly down this path, as the anticipated benefits of a coherent legal regime in this space would by far outweigh the hardships encountered in their pursuit.
